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PLEDGING PATENTS FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD: 
RISE AND FALL OF THE ECO-PATENT 
COMMONS 
Jorge L. Contreras, Bronwyn H. Hall, & Christian Helmers 
ABSTRACT 
Commons and pledge structures have been used to achieve 
various goals of patent holders, including the advancement of 
social and philanthropic aims. This Article, for the first time, 
analyzes the formation and structure of a widely acclaimed effort 
to pool patents for the promotion of green/clean technologies—the 
Eco-Patent Commons (EcoPC)—as well as its actual impact on 
technology diffusion and the factors leading to its demise in 2016. 
We combine quantitative econometric techniques with qualitative 
interviews to paint the most complete picture of this innovative 
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and ambitious effort to date. Our quantitative results show that 
the patents contributed to the EcoPC were, on average, less cited 
than comparable patents, and that the contribution of these 
patents to the EcoPC did not increase their rates of citation. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that the availability of these 
patents through the EcoPC increased the diffusion of pledged 
inventions. Our interviews revealed significant structural and 
organizational issues that limited both the attractiveness of the 
EcoPC to new participants and its value to potential users of 
pledged technology. Our findings have implications for the 
effectiveness of patent commons in enabling the diffusion of 
patented technologies more broadly. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The role of patents in promoting, or hindering, the mitigation 
of global climate change and environmental degradation is 
uncertain and increasingly contested. In Vice President Al Gore’s 
2017 film, An Inconvenient Sequel: Truth to Power,1 Mr. Gore 
portrays the negotiations leading up to the 2015 Paris Agreement 
on international climate change.2 In one segment, he focuses on a 
standoff between the government of India, a major carbon emitter, 
and other countries. In attempting to mediate the standoff, Mr. 
Gore seeks to broker a trade: India would give up its national coal 
power plan, and U.S. tech company SolarCity would pledge its 
solar technology patents for royalty-free use in the developing 
world.3 This commitment of patents would, presumably, enable 
India to implement environmentally friendly solar technology in 
lieu of its carbon-spewing coal-powered plants. 
According to the film, the SolarCity patent pledge was 
inspired by a similar commitment made by Elon Musk, the 
outspoken CEO of Tesla Motors.4 In 2014, Musk famously blogged 
that “All Our Patent Are Belong To You,” seemingly contributing 
Tesla’s valuable patent portfolio to the world at no cost.5 Though 
it remains unclear whether SolarCity ever pledged its patents and 
                                                     
 1. AN INCONVENIENT SEQUEL: TRUTH TO POWER (Participant Media and Actual 
Films 2017).  
 2. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016).  
 3. SolarCity is reported to have a substantial patent portfolio. See Matthew Rimmer, 
Elon Musk’s Open Innovation: Tesla, Intellectual Property, and Climate Change, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLEAN ENERGY 515, 540–41 (Matthew Rimmer ed., 2018). 
 4. Tesla acquired SolarCity in 2016 for approximately $2 billion. Prior to the 
acquisition, Musk was the chairman of SolarCity and the cousin of its CEO Lyndon Rive. 
Danielle Muoio, It’s Official: Tesla’s Acquisition of SolarCity Has Closed, BUS. INSIDER 
(Nov. 21, 2016, 9:52 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-solarcity-deal-closes-2016 
-11 [https://perma.cc/3JA2-GRK2]. 
 5. Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong To You, TESLA (June 12, 2014), https://  
www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you [https://perma.cc/PQ6D-P47Q]; see also 
Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 544–45 (2015) [hereinafter 
Contreras, Patent Pledges] (introducing Tesla pledge); Jorge L. Contreras, The Evolving 
Patent Pledge Landscape, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, Apr. 2018, at 1, 3 
[hereinafter Contreras, Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape], https://www.cigionline.org/ 
sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.166%20Cover_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUA2-25 
AE] (discussing evolution of Tesla pledge over time). 
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whether any deal in Paris was brokered by Mr. Gore,6 the episode 
brings to the forefront the potential role that patents can play in 
fostering the development of technologies to mitigate global 
climate change. 
In the area of climate change mitigation and other green/clean 
technology (green/clean tech), a variety of proposals to increase 
innovation and diffusion of technology have been made, many of 
them involving adjustments to the patent system.7 Such proposals 
have encompassed strategies to increase the number of green/
clean tech patents to encourage private sector investment in 
innovation and to decrease either the number or potency of such 
patents in an effort to reduce the costs of innovation globally. In 
the first category (enhancing patenting), proposals have been 
made to accelerate or “fast track” patent applications for green/
clean tech inventions,8 and to aggregate patents into an 
international licensing organization situated to tax greenhouse 
gas emitters.9 In the category of decreasing the strength of, or 
increasing access to the technology covered by, green/clean tech 
patents, proposals have been made for: the compulsory licensing 
of green/clean tech patents by governments;10 the exercise of 
                                                     
 6. See, e.g., Chris White, Top Indian Official Refutes Claim that Al Gore Sealed 
India’s Inclusion in Paris Deal, DAILY CALLER (July 25, 2017, 4:17 PM), https://dailycaller.  
com/2017/07/25/top-indian-official-refutes-claim-that-al-gore-sealed-indias-inclusion-in-pa 
ris-deal/ [https://perma.cc/T3XP-2DVG]; Emily Atkin, The Troubling Return of Al Gore, 
NEW REPUBLIC (July 24, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/143966/troubling-return-al-
gore-profile-inconvenient-sequel [https://perma.cc/UTM9-YK5N]. 
 7. Some commentators are skeptical that patent-based incentive mechanisms will 
have a meaningful effect on the development and dissemination of new technologies to 
address climate change. See, e.g., ERIC L. LANE, CLEAN TECH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
ECO-MARKS, GREEN PATENTS, AND GREEN INNOVATION 236–37 (2011) (“[T]ransfer and 
implementation of clean technologies is happening, again and again, despite what the 
debating parties may think or say. . . . Intellectual property protection did not prove a 
barrier to these agreements and transactions.”); Ofer Tur-Sinai, Patents and Climate 
Change: A Skeptic’s View, 48 ENVTL. L. 211, 222–25 (2018) (favoring incentive mechanisms 
such as prizes and subsidies). 
 8. See Anthony E. Chavez, Exclusive Rights to Saving the Planet: The Patenting of 
Geoengineering Inventions, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 31–32 (2015); Patrick 
Gattari, The Role of Patent Law in Incentivizing Green Technology, 11 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 41, 44 (2013); Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Fast-Tracking Green Patent 
Applications: An Empirical Analysis, INT’L CTR. TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Feb. 2013), 
https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/downloads/2013/02/fast-tracking-green-patent-app 
lications-an-empirical-analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/96V9-V73D] (describing fast-tracking 
programs around the world). 
 9. See John Vendenberg et al., Using Patents to Curtail Climate Change: A Proposal, 
LAW360 (Feb. 23, 2015, 10:18 AM), https://www.law360.com/amp/articles/622594. 
 10. See, e.g., Chavez, supra note 8, at 21–27 (discussing benefits and practical 
difficulties of compulsory licensing approaches); Jerome Reichman et al., Intellectual 
Property and Alternatives: Strategies for Green Innovation 30–33 (Chatham House Energy, 
Env’t and Dev. Programme Working Paper No. 08/03, 2008) (“[T]he primary defensive 
options for developing countries would reside in article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, which 
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governmental march-in rights;11 the acquisition of green/clean 
tech patents by a fund which would make them freely (or more 
broadly) available;12 an exemption from patent infringement for 
noncommercial research and experimental use;13 the statutory 
exclusion of some green/clean technologies from the scope of patent 
protection;14 and constraints on the exclusive licensing of green/
clean tech inventions.15 At the extreme end of environmental 
activism, calls have been made to abolish patents entirely.16 In this 
Article, we examine a private ordering approach to incentivizing 
the dissemination of green/clean technologies: the collective patent 
pledge, or commons. 
Although patents give their owners the right to exclude others 
from practicing a patented technology or to charge them for the 
privilege of doing so,17 an increasing number of firms across 
different industries have begun to make voluntary pledges 
intended to limit their ability to enforce their patents to the fullest 
                                                     
allows compulsory licenses to be issued on patented inventions for almost any reason, 
subject to the payment of compensation and certain other technical prerequisites.”). But see 
Charles R. McManis & Jorge L. Contreras, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property: 
A Viable Policy Lever for Promoting Access to Critical Technologies?, in TRIPS AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: TOWARDS A NEW IP WORLD ORDER? 109, 112–13, 127–30 (Gustavo 
Ghidini et al. eds., 2014) (questioning advisability and effectiveness of compulsory licensing 
in clean/green tech area). 
 11. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 301, 354–56 (2011) (suggesting that governmental march-in criteria be clarified and 
expanded in this area). 
 12. See Matthew Rimmer, The Paris Agreement: Intellectual Property, Technology 
Transfer, and Climate Change, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLEAN ENERGY: THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT AND CLIMATE JUSTICE 33, 39–40 (Matthew Rimmer ed., 2018) (describing the 
Green Climate Fund); Chavez, supra note 8, at 32–35 (urging the U.S. government to 
facilitate formation of a “climate-engineering patent pool” that would grant licenses broadly 
at accessible rates). 
 13. See Jesse L. Reynolds et al., Solar Climate Engineering and Intellectual Property: 
Toward a Research Commons, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 45–46 (2017) (applying the 
historical exemption to patentability of natural phenomena to climate innovations); 
Sarnoff, supra note 11, at 344–48. 
 14. See Sarnoff, supra note 11, at 336–43 (proposing exclusion of basic R&D from 
patentability); Shobita Parthasarathy et al., A Public Good? Geoengineering and 
Intellectual Property 11–12 (Univ. of Mich. Gerald R. Ford Sch. of Pub. Pol’y Sci., Tech. & 
Pub. Pol’y Program, Working Paper No. 10-1, 2010) (recommending that geoengineering 
patents, especially those related to mechanisms to combat climate change, be narrow, if 
awarded at all). 
 15. See Sarnoff, supra note 11, at 352–54. 
 16. See Mark Read, Al Gore’s Convenient Infomercial, INDYPENDENT, Sept. 2017, at 
15 (“If we are to survive as a species, the legal, economic and cultural structures that 
privilege private ownership of intellectual property over the interests of the many must be 
challenged and fought at every turn. This must become a cornerstone of our fight for a more 
just and sustainable future. If we do not pull this system out by its roots, it is going to kill 
us all and our children.”). 
 17. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
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degree.18 Yet the pledging of patents, even to the extent that they 
will not be asserted against infringers, stops short of abandoning 
or contributing them to the public domain.19 Thus, under a pledge 
model, also referred to as a patent commons, patent assets are 
retained by their owners, who continue to incur maintenance and 
other fees, but the use of such patents for traditional exclusionary 
purposes is significantly curtailed.20 
Patent commons differ from other mechanisms used to share 
patents, including cross-licensing agreements and patent pools, in 
important ways. For example, in both cross-licensing agreements 
and patent pools, access to patents is granted only to participating 
companies, although in the case of patent pools, outsiders often 
can also access the pooled patents for a fee.21 The main difference 
between these structures and further-reaching mechanisms, like 
the patent commons, therefore, is that the commons typically 
confers benefits on all third parties, regardless of their 
contribution to the commons and typically without a formal 
contract or payment.22  
Patent pledges are made for a variety of reasons, including 
the promotion of broad product interoperability through common 
technical standards, the advocacy of new technology platforms, 
and the pursuit of social goals.23 Over the past few decades, 
significant patent pledges have been made in areas such as open 
source software (e.g., IBM, Sun, Google and Red Hat (now owned 
by IBM) have each pledged that they will not assert hundreds of 
                                                     
 18. Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 545–46. 
 19. Several large patent holders, including IBM, have a well-articulated strategy for 
abandoning unused patents. See Dennis Crouch, IBM’s Patent Abandonment Strategy, 
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 1, 2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/ibms-patent-abandonme 
nt-strategy.html [https://perma.cc/9EL2-TEC5]; Bridget Diakun, Inside the IBM Patent 
Factory, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (May 9, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/patents/inside- 
ibm-patent-factory (“Although IBM invests heavily in building its portfolio, it actively 
abandons patents to streamline its holdings.”). Other coordinated industry efforts have 
contributed substantial intellectual property assets to the public domain for self-interested 
purposes. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets 
Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 434–37 (2009). 
 20. Eco-Patent Commons: Joining or Submitting Additional Patents to the Commons, 
WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. [hereinafter EcoPC Contributions], http://  
www.otromundoesposible.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/EcoPatentGroundRules.pdf [htt 
ps://perma.cc/E25F-P5K6] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (containing so-called “defensive 
suspension” provisions that allow pledging companies to deny royalty-free access to other 
companies that assert their patents against the pledging firm, suggesting that some patents 
are held for purely defensive purposes rather than as exclusionary rights). 
 21. See Anne Layne-Farrar & Josh Lerner, To Join or Not To Join: Examining Patent 
Pool Participation and Rent Sharing Rules, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 294, 296 (2011). 
 22. See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 546. 
 23. See id. at 572–74, 594; Contreras, Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape, supra note 
5, at 4–5. 
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patents against open source software implementations); electric 
vehicles (in addition to Tesla Motors’ famous pledge, Toyota has 
made a significant pledge of patents covering its hydrogen cell 
vehicles);24 and biotechnology (e.g., Monsanto’s pledge not to 
assert patents covering genetically modified seeds against farmers 
inadvertently growing them).25 Over the years, some collective 
patent pledges, pledge communities and patent commons have 
achieved significant adoption in the marketplace, while others 
have not. For example, from its inception in 2014 through late 
2017, Google’s License on Transfer (LOT) network, in which 
patent holders commit not to transfer their patents to patent 
assertion entities (PAEs), attracted 180 members and more than 
180,000 patents.26 In contrast, the Defensive Patent License (DPL) 
network, which was launched in the same year with similar goals, 
has attracted few members.27 The differences in take-up between 
these two pledge communities can be attributed to a variety of 
factors including internal governance mechanisms, commitment 
details, and evangelization.28 
Unlike patent pledges that seek to foster technology or 
platform adoption, some pledges are made in support of 
philanthropic or corporate social responsibility (CSR) goals. For 
example, a number of patent pools seeking to improve access to 
lifesaving drugs in the developing world have emerged over the 
years. These pools, which include the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) 
and The Pool for Open Innovation Against Neglected Tropical 
Diseases (NTD Pool), also include major pharmaceutical 
companies who participate largely in a philanthropic capacity 
(with concomitant public relations (PR) benefits).29 
The EcoPC was an innovative not-for-profit initiative 
undertaken by a small group of industrial firms with the goal of 
pledging “green technology” patents for broad, royalty-free use in 
                                                     
 24. Toyota Opens the Door and Invites the Industry to the Hydrogen Future, TOYOTA 
USA NEWSROOM (Jan. 5, 2015), https://pressroom.toyota.com/toyota-fuel-cell-patents-ces- 
2015/ [https://perma.cc/AX8N-JQB5]; see also Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 
544 (discussing Toyota pledge). 
 25. See generally Contreras, Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape, supra note 5, at 1–2; 
Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 545. 
 26. The LOT Network Community, LOT NETWORK, http://lotnet.com/our-community/ 
#member-list [https://perma.cc/Q9CJ-65Z8] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
 27. See Contreras, Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 590–93 (describing philanthropic 
motivation for pledges); Michael Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
103, 121–27 (2012) (discussing MPP and NTD Pool). 
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addressing environmental challenges.30 The thirteen EcoPC 
participants collectively pledged a total of 248 “green technology” 
patents (94 priority patents or distinct inventions) to the EcoPC 
between its formation in 2008 and its discontinuation in 2016.31 
When created, the EcoPC had the ambitious stated objective 
of promoting the diffusion of green technologies to increase and 
accelerate their adoption and to encourage follow-on innovation. 
The theoretical mechanism to achieve this was simple: by 
suspending a patent owner’s ability to assert a patent against any 
users of the patented technology, the technology—which had 
already been disclosed by the patent publication—would become 
available for royalty-free use by any interested party. In principle, 
this mechanism could address the well-known welfare cost 
associated with temporary market power granted by patents that 
likely slows the diffusion of patented technology.32 A second 
possible benefit was that those building on the contributed 
technologies might find other (commercial) outputs of the 
contributing firm useful, or might add to a knowledge base from 
which the firm would benefit.33 
Following its creation, the EcoPC attracted substantial 
attention in the scholarly literature,34 the popular press,35 and the 
                                                     
 30. Dechezleprêtre, supra note 8.  
 31. See infra notes 41, 55 and accompanying text. Patents are territorial rights. That 
is, separate patents on the same invention have to be obtained in each jurisdiction where 
patent protection is desired. This means that there often exist multiple patents on the same 
invention, which are referred to as equivalents or members of a patent “family.” The 
“priority” patent in such a family is the first patent filed within a given set of equivalents.  
 32. Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, The Role of Patent Protection in 
(Clean/Green) Technology Transfer 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
16323, 2010). 
 33. Sharon Belenzon, Knowledge Flow and Sequential Innovation: Implications for 
Technology Diffusion, R&D and Market Value 5–7 (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Working 
Paper No. 721, 2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=893060 [https://perma.cc/R6Q6-N9GA]. 
Belenzon shows that it is profitable for a primary firm to cite a patent by a secondary firm 
if the instant patent cites the primary firm’s patent. The market values the mutual citations 
and the benefits of the feedback loop spill over to the primary firm. See id. 
 34. See, e.g., Andrew Boynton, Eco-Patent Commons: A Donation Approach 
Encouraging Innovation Within the Patent System, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
659, 679–82 (2011); Mattioli, supra note 29, at 142–43; Mark Van Hoorebeek & William 
Onzivu, The Eco-Patent Commons and Environmental Technology Transfer: Implications 
for Efforts to Tackle Climate Change, 2010 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 13, 13.  
 35. See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley, Companies to Share Eco-Friendly Patents, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 14, 2008, at B2; Mary Tripsas, Everybody in the Pool of Green Innovation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at BU5. 
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blogosphere.36 Even environmental activist groups such as 
Greenpeace had good things to say about the project.37 
But in addition to accolades, the EcoPC attracted some 
skepticism regarding its potential effectiveness. This skepticism 
focused, among other things, on whether a commons could offer 
sufficient incentives to attract valuable patent pledges and 
thereby achieve its ambitious goals.38 
In contrast to other mechanisms designed to share patents, 
such as cross-licensing and patent pools, patent owners in the 
EcoPC maintained ownership of their patents (which is costly)39 
while making those patents freely accessible to third parties, 
including competitors. Some competitive safeguards were left in 
place, notably a defensive termination right in case a different 
patent was asserted against the pledger by a firm using the 
patented technology. For these reasons, it was not obvious what 
benefits the commons offered to participants beyond reputational 
enhancement. This, in turn, meant that participants could have 
had incentives to minimize their costs by pledging only patents 
with little commercial value and allowing them to lapse shortly 
after they were pledged.40 
In an earlier study, Hall and Helmers studied the 
characteristics of the patents pledged to the EcoPC.41 Their study 
confirmed that the pledged patents did claim environmentally 
friendly technologies. Moreover, pledged patents were of similar 
value to other patents in the pledging firm’s portfolio, but of lower 
value than other patents in their class, using the usual patent 
value indicators (based on citations, family size, number of patent 
technology classes, etc.). The findings suggested that the EcoPC 
participants might have pledged patents with the potential to 
                                                     
 36. See, e.g., David Bollier, New Eco-Patent Commons, DAVID BOLLIER (Feb. 8, 2008, 
12:00 AM), http://www.bollier.org/new-eco-patent-commons [https://perma.cc/L767-UENN] 
(“The idea, inspired by open source software and the Creative Commons, is to promote more 
eco-friendly manufacturing and waste-reduction processes. Bravo to IBM, Nokia, Sony and 
Pitney Bowes!”). 
 37. See, e.g., Bulkeley, supra note 35, at B2 (quoting John Coequyt, an energy policy 
specialist with the Washington office of Greenpeace, who praised the EcoPC as a potential 
“way to solve the [global warming] problem by voluntary action”). 
 38. See Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Sink or Swim: Eco-Patent Commons and the Transfer 
of Environmentally Sustainable Technologies, BIORES TRADE & ENV’T REV., May 2008, at 
14, 16. 
 39. The EcoPC participants were not, however, required to continue to pay 
maintenance fees on pledged patents. See infra Section IV.B (discussing lapse of patents 
for nonpayment of maintenance fees). 
 40. See infra notes 92–97 and accompanying discussion (examples of patents 
pledged). 
 41. Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, Innovation and Diffusion of Clean/Green 
Technology: Can Patent Commons Help?, 66 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 33 (2013). 
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diffuse environmentally friendly technologies that were possibly 
useful to other firms and researchers. 
To study whether the EcoPC increased the diffusion of green 
technologies, Hall and Helmers looked for changes in forward 
citations to pledged patents following their addition to the 
commons. They constructed a set of control patents that matched 
the publication authorities, priority years, and technology classes 
of the EcoPC patents. They examined the pattern of citations by 
subsequent patent applications to the set of EcoPC patents and 
their controls over time, before and after contribution and found 
that the EcoPC patents tended to be cited less than the patents in 
the control group before contribution to the EcoPC. However, the 
results after contribution were inconclusive because most of the 
patents were contributed in late 2008 and there was little data 
post-pledge as citation data was available only through early 2012, 
leaving little more than three years of citation data post-pledge. 
In this Article, we assess the effect of the EcoPC on technology 
diffusion and assess its impact more broadly, using several 
approaches. The first is a set of interviews with participants in the 
EcoPC and those responsible for it, described in Part III. These 
interviews provide helpful qualitative information that allows us 
to better understand the underlying causes of the EcoPC’s failure 
to encourage the diffusion of pledged technologies. The second is 
an updated look at the data on the patents pledged to the EcoPC, 
described mainly in Part IV. With the passage of time, 
substantially more citation data has become available (through 
2016 as opposed to early 2012 in Hall and Helmers’ earlier study). 
This allows us to reexamine the data and provide a more definitive 
answer to the question of whether the commons had any effect on 
technology diffusion, at least as reflected in subsequent patenting. 
The fact that several new commons were created at the same time 
the EcoPC was discontinued in 2016,42 also motivates us to revisit 
the viability of such patent commons more generally. Finally, we 
asked inventors of the patents that cited any of the EcoPC patents 
after they were pledged about the role that the pledge played in 
their decision to rely on an EcoPC patent as prior art. 
To summarize our main findings: we do not find any evidence 
that the EcoPC increased the diffusion of pledged patents. Pledged 
patents were cited less than the matched control patents before 
they entered the commons, suggesting that they were already less 
valuable, and their pledge does not change this. Inventors of citing 
patents unanimously indicated that the pledge, i.e., royalty-free 
                                                     
 42. See infra note 63. 
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access, did not affect their decision to rely on an EcoPC patent as 
prior art. In fact, none of the inventors that responded to our query 
were even aware that the cited patent was part of the EcoPC, and 
hence, royalty-free access played no role in their decision to rely 
on it as prior art. These results suggest that the commons had no 
effect on technology diffusion. Looking at the EcoPC priority 
patents, 82% had lapsed by July 2017 (26% expired, 18% were 
rejected or withdrawn, and 38% lapsed because of renewal fee 
nonpayment). Expired patents were not replaced by new patent 
pledges. This indicates that participating companies, in most 
cases, did not consider the benefits of the commons sufficiently 
large to maintain the patents in force. Our interviews with 
representatives of the EcoPC participants reveal several common 
critiques of the EcoPC’s structure and operational processes that 
help explain our quantitative findings, particularly EcoPC’s 
inability to provide information regarding the usage of contributed 
technologies.43 Another major impediment to diffusion was the 
lack of information provided by pledging companies beyond the 
patent documents that could have helped potential users 
(especially in developing countries) see potential applications of 
the pledged technologies. Finally, no concerted effort was made to 
group or link patents in the commons to any particular technology. 
This lack of coordination may have limited synergies that could 
have been created through a more deliberate approach to the 
technologies covered by contributed patents. 
This study both updates Hall and Helmers’ previous study 
and fills gaps in our understanding of the functioning and 
performance of the EcoPC and patent commons more generally. 
Providing a more definitive answer to the question of diffusion and 
the functioning of the EcoPC more broadly is important for three 
reasons. First, it offers insight regarding the manner in which 
patent pledges can support the diffusion and implementation of 
(green) technologies around the world. Second, it can inform the 
design of other pledge communities both in the environmental 
space and other key technology areas, such as electric vehicles, 
software, biotechnology, and agriculture. Third, it informs us more 
generally about the viability of patent commons created by for-
profit companies as a mechanism to share access to patented 
technology. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Part II 
describes the institutional design and history of the EcoPC. Part 
                                                     
 43. This feature of the commons also limits our ability to study subsequent use of the 
pledged patents, which is why we chose to focus on publicly-available citations to these 
patents. 
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III summarizes the findings from our interviews of participants in 
the EcoPC. In Part IV we turn to a quantitative analysis of these 
patents and their citations and discuss the results of our inventor 
survey. Finally, in Part V we analyze our findings and assess their 
impact on the planning and design of future patent commons. 
II. THE ECO-PATENT COMMONS: STRUCTURE AND 
DEVELOPMENT44 
The concept of the EcoPC as a collective mechanism for 
permitting broad usage of patents covering environmental 
technologies was originally developed by IBM in the mid-2000s as 
one of several corporate initiatives directed toward environmental 
protection and sustainability.45 Given IBM’s well-known patent 
strength,46 a program to promote environmental causes would 
capitalize on one of the company’s principal assets. IBM had 
already made significant commitments to the sharing of patents 
and other intellectual property (IP) in the area of open source code 
software.47 Accordingly, extending these initiatives to the 
environmental area was consistent with IBM’s existing corporate 
culture.48 
The idea behind the EcoPC was that industrial firms with 
large patent portfolios likely hold patents covering technologies 
                                                     
 44. The material in this part is derived both from the works cited and also from the 
interviews described in Part III, below. Additional information regarding the organization 
and history of the EcoPC can be found in Mattioli, supra note 29; see also Hall & Helmers, 
supra note 41; Bassem Awad, Global Patent Pledges: A Collaborative Mechanism for 
Climate Change Technology, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, Nov. 2015, at 1, 5–
6, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no.81.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV3K-QB6N]. 
 45. See infra note 54.  
 46. According to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office statistics, IBM regularly receives 
more U.S. patent grants than any other company in the world—over 7,000 patents in 2015 
alone. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS (UTILITY 
PATENTS) B1-1 (2015), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_15.pdf [http 
s://perma.cc/4G8K-H4UR]. 
 47. See IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, IBM (Jan. 
11, 2005), http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
73H7-VK8V]; see also Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 183, 188–94 (2004) (discussing IBM strategy related to patent non-assertion); Wen 
Wen et al., Patent Commons, Thickets, and Open Source Software Entry by Start-Up Firms 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19394, 2013), http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w19394.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F4M-MAHZ]. 
 48. The EcoPC explicitly compared itself to the open source movement, noting in its 
promotional materials that, “[a]s has been demonstrated by the open source software 
community, the free sharing of knowledge can provide a fertile ground for new collaboration 
and innovation. Sharing environmental patents can help others become more eco-efficient 
and operate in a more environmentally sustainable manner—enabling technology 
innovation to meet social innovation.” About the Eco-Patent Commons, ECO-PATENT 
COMMONS, http://ecopatentcommons.org/about-eco-patent-commons [http://web.archive.or 
g/web/20161025065740/http://ecopatentcommons.org/about-eco-patent-commons]. 
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with environmental applications, but because those technologies 
are not core to the firm’s business, they are languishing unused.49 
If, however, the patents covering these technologies could be made 
freely available to users around the world, then a significant public 
service could be rendered at a minimal cost to the patent holder. 
IBM publicly announced the concept for the EcoPC at its 
Global Innovation Outlook conference in 2006.50 It then initiated 
discussions with other large firms with which it had existing 
business ties and which it believed might be sympathetic to a 
collective approach to making environmental technologies more 
broadly available. In January 2008, IBM announced the launch of 
the EcoPC together with Nokia, Pitney Bowes, and Sony.51 A total 
of thirteen firms eventually joined the EcoPC as summarized in 
Table 1, below. 
 
                                                     
 49. Numerous studies have shown that many patents in corporate portfolios go 
unused. See, e.g., Paolo Giuri et al., Inventors and Invention Processes in Europe: Results 
from the PatVal-EU Survey, 36 RES. POL’Y 1107 (2007) (average 37% non-use by European 
patent holders); Salvatore Torrisi et al., Used, Blocking and Sleeping Patents: Empirical 
Evidence from a Large-Scale Inventor Survey, 45 RES. POL’Y 1374, 1379 (2016) (“Japan 
shows the largest share of unused patents (46%) compared to Europe (38%) and the U.S. 
(36%)”); Sadao Nagaoka & John P. Walsh, Commercialization and Other Uses of Patents in 
Japan and the US: Major Findings from the RIETI-Georgia Tech Inventor Survey (Research 
Inst. of Econ., Trade and Indus., Discussion Paper No. 09-E-011, 2009) (35% non-use by 
North American patent holders).  
 50. See Corporations Go Public with Eco-Friendly Patents, IBM NEWS ROOM (Jan. 14, 
2008), https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/23280.wss [https://perma.cc/92XX 
-WJWK]. 
 51. Id. 
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Table 1: Firm Participation in the EcoPC52 
 
Firm Date Joining EcoPC No. Patents 
Pledged* 
IBM Jan. 14, 2008 29 
Nokia Jan. 14, 2008 1 
Pitney Bowes Jan. 14, 2008 2 
Sony Jan. 14, 2008 4 
Bosch Sept. 8, 2008 24 
DuPont** Sept. 8, 2008 11 
Xerox Sept. 8, 2008 13 
Taisei Mar. 23, 2009 2 
Ricoh Mar. 23, 2009 1 
Dow Oct. 20, 2009 1 
Fuji Xerox Oct. 20, 2009 2 
Hewlett-Packard July 1, 2010 3 
Hitachi** July 25, 2011 1 
* Priority patents (i.e., patent families).  
** DuPont and Hitachi withdrew from the EcoPC in 2013, as of the transfer of EcoPC’s 
management from WBCSD to ELI. 
 
The stated mission of EcoPC was “to manage a collection of 
patents pledged for unencumbered use by companies and IP rights 
holders around the world to make it easier and faster to innovate 
and implement industrial processes that improve and protect the 
global environment.”53 Accordingly, patents eligible for inclusion 
in the EcoPC were required to belong to one of sixty enumerated 
International Patent Classification (IPC) codes relating to 
environmental or sustainability technology. Technologies sought 
by the EcoPC included energy conservation, pollution control, 
environmentally-friendly materials, water or materials use or 
reduction, and recyclability.54 Two hundred forty-eight patents 
were pledged to the EcoPC, with the last such contribution 
occurring in 2011.55 
To pledge a patent to the EcoPC, the owner was required to 
make an irrevocable covenant not to assert the patent—or “any 
                                                     
 52. E-PC All Pledged Patent, ECO-PATENT COMMONS, http://ecopatentcommons.org 
/sites/default/files/docs/ecopatent-database.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20170304221 
125/http://ecopatentcommons.org/sites/default/files/docs/ecopatent-database.pdf]. 
 53. EcoPC Contributions, supra note 20. 
 54. The Eco-Patent Commons: A Leadership Opportunity for Global Business to 
Protect the Planet, LEAN BUS. IR. (Jan. 2008) [hereinafter EcoPC Brochure], https://www.le 
anbusinessireland.ie/includes/documents/Eco-Patent%20Commons%20Brochure_011008% 
5b1%5d.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4VE-X7N8]. 
 55. See E-PC All Pledged Patent, supra note 52. 
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worldwide counterparts”—against any infringing machine, 
manufacture process or composition of matter that 
“reduces/eliminates natural resource consumption, reduces/
eliminates waste generation or pollution, or otherwise provides 
environmental benefit(s).”56 This being said, patent owners 
retained the (defensive termination) right to assert pledged 
patents against (a) any EcoPC participant that asserted any 
environmental patent against them, or (b) any non-EcoPC 
participant that asserted any patent against them.57 
The initial administrator of the EcoPC was the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), a 
Geneva-based non-governmental organization focused on 
environmental and sustainability issues.58 WBCSD’s initial duties 
consisted primarily of hosting the EcoPC website and promoting 
EcoPC to other WBCSD members for purposes of recruitment. 
WBCSD publicized the EcoPC among its members and attracted 
several of the participants that joined following the EcoPC’s 
formation.59  
Participation in the EcoPC was open to all individuals and 
companies in the world, the only requirement for participation 
being the pledging of one or more patents according to the EcoPC’s 
rules.60 Neither membership in WBCSD nor any additional dues 
or charges were required for EcoPC participation. The EcoPC itself 
was characterized as an unincorporated, nonprofit association.61 
In 2013, the administration of EcoPC was transferred from 
WBCSD to the Environmental Law Institute (ELI), a Washington, 
D.C.-based trade and advocacy organization.62 This transition was 
apparently orchestrated by IBM, which had withdrawn as a 
member of WBCSD, thereby eliminating the primary driver of 
WBCSD’s involvement. ELI, of which IBM was a significant 
                                                     
 56. EcoPC Contributions, supra note 20. 
 57. See EcoPC Brochure, supra note 54 (describing this as a “defensive termination” 
provision). 
 58. See Overview, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., https://www.wbcsd.o 
rg/Overview/About-us [https://perma.cc/CP5L-XKD5] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019); EcoPC 
Brochure, supra note 54.  
 59. See supra note 52 and Table 1. 
 60. Members of the EcoPC were required to complete a Membership 
Application/Pledge Form which bound them to comply with the EcoPC’s Non-Assert Pledge, 
Ground Rules and Governance Structure. See EcoPC Contributions, supra note 20.  
 61. See EcoPC Brochure, supra note 54. 
 62. See Royalty Free Environmental Patents, ENVTL. L. INST. (Oct. 2013), http://  
www. eli.org/news/royalty-free-environmental-patents [https://perma.cc/9BSV-YSGF]. See 
generally About the Environmental Law Institute, ENVTL. L. INST., https://www.eli.org/ 
about-environmental-law-institute [https://perma.cc/3FTX-SJMQ] (last visited Sept. 12, 
2019). 
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member, hosted the EcoPC website from 2013 through 2016, but 
was not actively engaged in recruiting new participants. Two 
EcoPC members, Hitachi and DuPont, withdrew from the EcoPC 
at the time of this administrative shift. No new patents were 
contributed to the EcoPC after Hitachi’s initial 2011 contribution. 
By 2016, very little activity was occurring at the EcoPC. 
Accordingly, in 2016, the EcoPC was formally discontinued.63 
Though the EcoPC has been shut down, pursuant to the 
EcoPC Ground Rules and pledge terms, the “irrevocable” non-
assertion pledge made with respect to each pledged patent will 
continue in accordance with its terms indefinitely.64 
III. INTERVIEWS 
This Part describes the results of a series of semi-structured 
interviews with representatives of participating companies, 
WBCSD and ELI.65 Here we focus on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the EcoPC that were identified by interviewees in 
an attempt to inform our interpretation of our quantitative results 
on the diffusion of pledged technologies. 
A. Methodology 
We identified individuals employed by EcoPC corporate 
participants who had been personally involved with their 
employer’s decision to join the EcoPC, its ongoing participation in 
the EcoPC, or both. Through online searches and informal 
inquiries, we were able to obtain valid and current contact details 
for representatives of nine of the thirteen EcoPC corporate 
participants. Seven of these individuals consented to be 
interviewed for this study (five by telephone and two by written 
                                                     
 63. Important Statement from the Board: Eco-Patent Commons to Cease Active 
Operations Effective May 18, 2016, ECO-PATENT COMMONS, https://ecopatentcommons.org/ 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170805131334/https://ecopatentcommons.org/]. Based on 
our interviews, see infra Part III, we understand that each EcoPC participant was consulted 
by IBM regarding the decision to wind-down the EcoPC. Apparently, there was no 
resistance to this course of action.  
 64. The Ground Rules make it clear that a patent owner’s EcoPC pledge will survive 
that owner’s withdrawal from the EcoPC. See EcoPC Contributions, supra note 20 
(“Voluntary or involuntary withdrawal shall not affect the non-assert as to any approved 
pledged patent(s) – the non-assert survives and remains in force.”). For example, Hitachi 
pledged a patent to the EcoPC in 2011, but withdrew from the EcoPC in 2013. This patent 
should remain pledged. See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 598.  
 65. Interviews were conducted by Contreras pursuant to a determination of “no 
human subject research” by the University of Utah Institutional Review Board (Jun. 26, 
2017, IRB 00102447). Interview subject information is held by Contreras.  
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466156 
57 HOUS. L. REV. 61 (2019) 
2019] ECO-PATENT COMMONS 77 
correspondence).66 In addition, we interviewed representatives of 
WBCSD and ELI who were directly involved in EcoPC activities.67 
Each interview subject responded to questions relating to his 
or her employer’s reasons for joining the EcoPC; how patents were 
selected for inclusion in the EcoPC; the company’s ongoing 
engagement with the EcoPC; views regarding the discontinuation 
of the EcoPC; the company’s overall satisfaction with the EcoPC; 
whether the company’s goals in joining the EcoPC were achieved; 
and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the EcoPC structure. 
In addition, representatives of the WBCSD and ELI were asked 
questions relating to their operation and management of the 
EcoPC. These responses are summarized below. 
The information gathered through these interviews is not 
necessarily representative of the views held by all member 
companies of the EcoPC as it is possible that interviewees selected 
into our sample based their responses on their subjective views of 
the performance of the EcoPC. That said, we obtained information 
from a relatively diverse sampling of company representatives 
(relative to the number of people involved in the project) across 
different geographical regions (companies based in the U.S., 
Europe, and Japan) and are therefore optimistic that these 
interviews offer relevant information in regard to a significant 
portion of the EcoPC participants’ views regarding the 
organization. 
B. General Responses 
1. Joining EcoPC. Based on the sample of EcoPC 
participants interviewed, it appears that the primary drive to 
participate in the EcoPC came from management within each 
corporation’s environmental, sustainability, or corporate social 
responsibility unit (for convenience, we refer to such business 
units as “environmental and social responsibility” or ESR). 
Although in most cases, the corporate legal or IP department was 
consulted, it was not the primary internal champion of 
participation in the EcoPC. In several cases, the decision to join 
the EcoPC was made by an executive or manager within the ESR 
                                                     
 66. The authors have agreed not to disclose the identities of either the individuals 
interviewed or the EcoPC participant companies that they represented with the exception 
of IBM given its central role in forming and managing the EcoPC.  
 67. Interview scripts differed for individuals representing EcoPC participants versus 
administrators. Each interview lasted approximately thirty to sixty minutes. Responses 
were coded by the interviewer. No compensation was offered to interview subjects.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466156 
57 HOUS. L. REV. 61 (2019) 
78 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [57:1 
unit, with the legal department being involved only later (to help 
identify suitable patents for contribution). 
Given the origin of EcoPC participation in corporate ESR 
units, it is not surprising that the rationales for joining the EcoPC 
were largely focused on improving global environmental 
conditions and sustainability. Several respondents mentioned a 
corporate culture of ESR, while a few expressed a desire to ensure 
that environmentally valuable technologies were made available 
in the developing world. Responses evoked themes of both 
environmental preservation/stewardship, as well as corporate 
social responsibility. 
With respect to each of the corporate EcoPC participants 
other than IBM, the company was approached directly by a 
representative of either IBM or the WBCSD regarding 
participation in the EcoPC. In several cases, a personal 
relationship at the managerial or executive level facilitated the 
decision to participate. 
One attractive feature that weighed in favor of joining the 
EcoPC was the lack of any financial commitment on the part of the 
participants. The only requirement for EcoPC participation was 
the identification and contribution of one or more patents. Several 
respondents indicated that their employers would probably not 
have joined the EcoPC had a membership fee been required. 
Probably due to the lack of a financial commitment, the corporate 
approval required for joining the EcoPC was, in some cases, 
handled at the level of the ESR unit. In at least one case, however, 
the company was required to obtain corporate approval at the 
board level. 
It is interesting to note that none of the individuals that were 
interviewed identified a PR benefit as a principal justification for 
joining the EcoPC. While several interviewees acknowledged that 
positive PR associated with the EcoPC may have contributed to 
the decision to join, in particular at the executive level, the 
principal support for EcoPC participation within firms originated 
in, and was championed by, ESR business units with express goals 
directed to environmental sustainability. This observation runs 
counter to several prior analyses of the EcoPC, which speculated 
that PR benefits may have been significant motivators for firms to 
join.68 Indeed, even the promotional materials created by the 
WBCSD to recruit additional EcoPC members emphasize these PR 
                                                     
 68. See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 591; Van Hoorebeek & Onzivu, 
supra note 34, at 18.  
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benefits.69 Yet, it seems that PR may have played a relatively 
modest role in the decision of firms to join the EcoPC. 
2. Selection of Patents. It was a starting premise of most 
firms that the patents pledged to the EcoPC would not be central 
to the firm’s commercial interests. In fact, this feature was a 
“selling point” for membership in the commons: the patents that 
would be contributed were not expected to “represent an essential 
source of business advantage” for their owners.70 As explained by 
one senior IBM executive, “[m]any patented environmental 
technologies are not strategic, so sharing maximizes the social 
benefit without sacrificing competitive advantage.”71 Thus, the 
patents contributed to the EcoPC were largely tangential to the 
primary business interests of the members. For example, IBM 
pledged a patent relating to recyclable cardboard packaging for 
electronic parts,72 Nokia contributed a patent for recycling 
obsolete cellphones for use as calculators and personal digital 
assistants,73 DuPont contributed a patented method for detecting 
pollution in soil, air or water by using a photoluminescent 
microorganism,74 and Pitney Bowes contributed a patent claiming 
a design for electronic scales that are less likely to be damaged 
when they are overloaded75 (a Pitney Bowes official explained that 
the patent related to the environment because “if you have a 
technology that extends the life of electronics, you keep it out of 
the waste stream”).76 
The manner in which specific patents were selected for 
contribution to the EcoPC varied among participants. IBM, 
reputedly the largest patent holder in the world, utilized a variety 
of internal searching and analysis tools to determine which of its 
patents were suitable candidates for contribution: both because 
they fit into the EcoPC’s approved technology categories and were 
not actively being commercialized by IBM. Other firms used 
similarly sophisticated patent searching methodologies, including 
analysis of external citations to patent documents to determine 
whether patents had potential financial value. Some firms, even 
those with large patent portfolios, used less formal approaches. In 
                                                     
 69. See EcoPC Brochure, supra note 54.  
 70. See About the Eco Patent Commons, supra note 48. 
 71. See Tripsas, supra note 35 (quoting Wayne Balta, Vice President of Corporate 
Environmental Affairs and Product Safety at IBM).  
 72. See U.S. Patent No. 6,997,323 (issued Feb. 14, 2006).  
 73. See U.S. Patent No. 7,251,458 (issued July 31, 2007). 
 74. See U.S. Patent No. 5,731,163 (issued Mar. 24, 1998).  
 75. See U.S. Patent No. 5,521,334 (issued May 28, 1996). 
 76. Bulkeley, supra note 35, at B2 (quoting Angelo Chaclas, Deputy General Counsel 
of Pitney Bowes). 
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one case, a patent was identified because a senior environmental 
manager at the company was named as an inventor on it. Another 
company asked its internal managers at the product division level 
to recommend patents for contribution. At one company, the 
majority of patents contributed originated within the ESR 
business unit, which championed EcoPC membership within the 
company. In all cases, EcoPC participants selected patents for 
contribution through internal mechanisms and did not engage 
external consultants or attorneys to assist with the search or 
selection process, which also helped keep the costs of participating 
in the EcoPC low. 
3. Ongoing Engagement. All respondents indicated that a 
meaningful, though not overwhelming, amount of effort was 
required at the initiation of EcoPC participation, largely to 
identify relevant patents to contribute. After that initial 
determination was made, however, most firms (IBM being the 
notable exception) indicated that they engaged very little with the 
EcoPC. As noted above, there were occasional telephone 
conferences during which participants were updated regarding the 
EcoPC’s activities, but after 2011, when the last new member 
joined, there was little in the way of updates. As noted above, none 
of the individuals that were interviewed recalled participating in 
any formal vote of EcoPC members, even when the decision to 
wind down the organization was made. This being said, most of 
the respondents did not object to this minimal level of involvement 
and did not feel the need to be involved to a greater degree. 
4. Discontinuation. Each respondent was satisfied with the 
decision to wind down the EcoPC, indicating that the organization 
had run its course and provided comparatively little value by the 
time that it concluded. None of the respondents expressed 
disappointment or disagreement with the decision to discontinue 
the EcoPC. In fact, at least three respondents were unaware, at 
the time they were interviewed, that the EcoPC had been 
discontinued more than a year earlier, demonstrating that, at 
least in these cases, the EcoPC was a fairly insignificant activity 
for these companies. 
C. Critiques of EcoPC 
As noted above, most respondents viewed the EcoPC as a 
valuable demonstration of corporate willingness to collaborate to 
achieve environmental and sustainability goals. The PR benefits 
of EcoPC participation were also viewed as valuable by some 
companies. However, each of the respondents expressed 
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dissatisfaction with at least some aspects of the EcoPC which 
helps explain its failure to encourage the diffusion of the pledged 
technologies and ultimately the EcoPC’s shutdown: 
1. Membership and Recruitment. At its height in 2011, the 
EcoPC had thirteen corporate participants.77 Though these firms 
were all major global enterprises with large patent portfolios, they 
still represented only a tiny fraction of the total potential 
membership in the organization. Particularly given that the 
EcoPC charged no membership fee, it was somewhat puzzling that 
so few firms joined. While WBCSD did appear to promote 
membership in the EcoPC, few of WBCSD’s many members 
elected to join. Based on our discussions with EcoPC members, we 
believe that possible impediments to recruitment were: (a) the 
perceived difficulty and expense of identifying suitable patents for 
contribution; (b) a belief among potential members that they 
lacked patents that were suitable for contribution; and (c) an 
aversion to the idea of contributing potentially valuable patents to 
the EcoPC without compensation, a view generally held by legal 
and IP departments in contrast to corporate divisions focused on 
sustainability and corporate social responsibility. 
2. No Tracking of Usage. All respondents observed that 
there was no effective way to determine whether the technologies 
covered by patents pledged to the EcoPC had been utilized.78 As a 
result, it was difficult for them to draw conclusions regarding 
whether the EcoPC was worth the effort, and to determine 
whether the goals of improving environmental conditions and 
sustainability were being met. Moreover, without clear success 
metrics, it was difficult to justify devoting ongoing effort to the 
EcoPC to upper management at some companies. Several 
respondents indicated that the EcoPC made a conscious decision 
not to require users to register with the website or report back to 
the EcoPC, as such requirements would serve as barriers to use of 
the website. 
Running somewhat counter to these comments, one 
interviewee noted that, in the early phase of the EcoPC, he/she 
received informal approaches from potential users seeking to 
understand the technology that had been made available through 
the EcoPC. This respondent indicated that during group calls with 
                                                     
 77. See supra note 52 and Table 1. 
 78. This weakness was identified by commentators soon after the EcoPC’s formation. 
See Jo Bowman, The Eco-Patent Commons: Caring Through Sharing, WIPO MAG., June 
2009, at 11, 12, https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/wipo_magazine/en/pdf/2009/wipo_ 
pub_121_2009_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2V5-P6EN]. 
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EcoPC representatives, they would share information regarding 
how many calls of this nature they had received. However, such 
informal inquiries dropped off after the initial years of the EcoPC, 
which may suggest that the technologies were no longer perceived 
as useful. 
WBCSD, at least initially, tracked hits to the EcoPC website 
and shared this information with the participants.79 However, as 
noted above, identifying information about visitors was not 
collected, and it was not clear whether visitors were academics, 
students, attorneys, journalists or potential users of the 
technologies. 
3. Notice of Available Technologies. It was noted by several 
interviewees that the cataloging of patents on the EcoPC website, 
which was organized by contributing company rather than 
technology area, was not particularly intuitive or informative. It 
required potential users to look up the relevant patents one by one 
in order to understand the technology being offered. Moreover, 
usually only a single patent family member was listed, requiring 
users to identify the remaining patent family members 
themselves. This procedure would have required both substantial 
effort on the part of potential users, as well as a high degree of 
familiarity with the format and terminology of patent 
documents.80 As documented previously by Hall and Helmers, the 
website also listed a number of erroneous patent numbers, another 
potential source of frustration for users.81 Taken together, these 
design shortfalls likely impeded the widespread usage of the 
EcoPC’s resources. 
4. Lack of Technology Transfer. Another issue raised by 
several respondents was that the EcoPC sought to promote the 
dissemination of green technologies through patents alone. Yet 
complex technologies often cannot be understood and 
implemented, especially by non-experts working in the developing 
world, merely through patent disclosures.82 Some form of 
                                                     
 79. Hall & Helmers, supra note 41, analyzed the data on web hits in an earlier study 
to find a highly skewed distribution of hits, only thirty-six patents received any hits. 
Nevertheless, the analysis also indicated a positive correlation between web hits and 
forward citations by other patents.  
 80. It is worth pointing out that this situation is changing rapidly at the present time, 
since Google patent search now includes the members of the patent family in its results. 
However, this feature was not available during most of the life of the EcoPC.  
 81. See Hall & Helmers, supra note 41, at 37.  
 82. See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Beyond Eureka: What Creators Want (Freedom, Credit, 
and Audiences) and How Intellectual Property Can Better Give It to Them (by Supporting, 
Sharing, Licensing, and Attribution), 114 U. MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1101–02 (reviewing 
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technology assistance or transfer is generally required to enable 
local users to take advantage of patented technologies, or even to 
realize that such technologies are available and applicable to local 
problems. This is especially the case with complex engineering and 
infrastructural technologies.83 This issue was recognized by critics 
soon after the formation of the EcoPC,84 and continued to be an 
issue throughout the life of the organization. 
5. Emphasis on the Developing World. One of the motivating 
principles behind the EcoPC was that patents would be made 
freely available to users in the developing world,85 much as the 
MPP and NTD Pool focused on the pressing health needs of 
underdeveloped countries.86 However, many of the EcoPC 
contributed technologies had little relevance to industries in the 
developing world. For example, one of IBM’s contributed patents 
related to a technique for cleaning semiconductor wafers using 
ozone gas to eliminate contaminants produced by chemical 
cleaning processes.87 While this invention has a clear 
environmental valence, it would seemingly be useful only in a few 
industrialized countries that already have multi-billion dollar 
semiconductor fabrication plants. 
In addition, the focus on the developing world belies a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the global patent system by 
some of the EcoPC planners. Patents prevent usage of a patented 
technology only in the countries where patents are issued. Most 
companies do not seek patent protection in the least-developed 
                                                     
JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH (2015)); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose 
Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 561 (2012).  
 83. See JOHN BARTON ET AL., INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY, REPORT OF THE UK COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 138, 146, 150 (2002), http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ciprf 
ullfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/572W-7DM9]; McManis & Contreras, supra note 10, at 127 
(“Unlike essential medicines, many clean technologies are not consumer products, but 
infrastructure improvements and capital projects such as wind farms, nuclear reactors, 
transmission grids and carbon recapture retrofitting of existing factories. While aspects of 
the design and operation of these facilities may be covered by patents, it is likely that 
technical skill and know-how will be more critical in implementing these technologies in 
the developing world.”).  
 84. See Srinivas, supra note 38, at 17 (“Mere availability of one or two patents in a 
technology will not facilitate the transfer of [environmentally sustainable technologies] . . . . 
[C]ommercialisation [sic] involves training, learning to adopt and make efficient use of the 
technology. Therefore, while the availability of patents is necessary, it is not sufficient: 
access alone will not result in meaningful technology transfers or the optimum use of 
patents. There is thus a need to enable access to patents, but as part of a broader strategy 
of transfer of [technology].”). 
 85. See Tripsas, supra note 35, at 5 (“[T]he hope is to encourage [the contributed 
technologies’] widespread adoption, particularly in the developing world.”). 
 86. See Mattioli, supra note 29, at 121–27. 
 87. See U.S. Patent No. 6,178,973 (issued Jan. 30, 2001). 
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countries, either because protection is uncertain in those 
countries, or because their markets are underdeveloped and 
procuring patent protection is not viewed as cost effective.88 Even 
in middle-income countries, multinationals tend to focus on 
pharmaceutical patenting and patenting in specific areas where 
the country in question is competitive.89 Accordingly, many 
technologies that are patented in the developed world are not 
themselves patented in the developing world.90 This general rule 
certainly applies to the patents contributed to the EcoPC, most of 
which have “family” members throughout the developed world 
(North America, Europe, Asia Pacific – see Table 4 below), but few 
if any patent family members in the developing world. Thus, 
organizations in the developing world already have the right to 
exploit many technologies disclosed in patents filed in the 
developed world. But they do not do so because, as discussed 
above, the utilization of even moderately complex technologies is 
not possible without significant training and technology transfer 
activity that cannot be accomplished through the grant of patent 
rights alone. In addition, technologies patented in the developed 
world may not be targeted to needs in the developing world 
without extensive further development.91 
Ironically, the entities that would have most benefited from 
the non-assertion covenants made by EcoPC members were 
sophisticated firms in developed countries. At least one 
representative acknowledged this, noting that the most likely user 
of some of the company’s contributed patents would be 
environmental service companies. Yet because the EcoPC made no 
concerted outreach to promote the availability of contributed 
technologies, even sophisticated firms were unlikely to find and 
use these technologies. 
6. Shift in Corporate Priorities. Several interview 
respondents noted that corporate support for ESR initiatives 
                                                     
 88. See generally AHN SANGHOON ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 33–90 (2014) (explaining patenting strategies in developing countries). 
 89. See generally M.J. Abud et al., The Use of Intellectual Property in Chile (World 
Intell. Prop. Org., Working Paper No. 11, 2013); Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, 
The Impact of International Patent Systems: Evidence from Accession to the European 
Patent Convention (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24207, 2018). 
 90. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 91. The importance of technology transfer to the developing world in the area of 
green/cleantech has been emphasized before. See, e.g., Joy Y. Xiang, Addressing Climate 
Change: Domestic Innovation, International Aid and Collaboration, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. 
PROP. & ENT. L. 196, 212–22 (2016) (surveying international agreements and efforts toward 
transfer of environmental technologies to developing world); Reichman et al., supra note 
10, at 25–37. 
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within their own companies had lagged during the life of the 
EcoPC, and that budgetary and resource constraints resulted in a 
de-emphasis of ESR initiatives. Some speculated that these 
industry-wide trends may have affected the willingness of new 
members to join the EcoPC. At least one interview subject 
identified his own company’s declining commitment to 
sustainability during the period in which the EcoPC was in effect. 
IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
In this Part, we used the data on patents pledged to the EcoPC 
and their matched controls to analyze: (1) the legal status of EcoPC 
patents to gauge whether member companies considered 
continued ownership of their pledged patents as sufficiently 
important to incur the associated costs; and (2) the diffusion of the 
technologies protected by patents pledged to the EcoPC as 
measured by citations received from other patents. 
A. Data 
For the purpose of our quantitative analysis, we updated the 
database previously used by Hall and Helmers. This means that 
for comparison purposes, we restricted the set of patents to all 
patents pledged prior to July 2010, which excludes the four 
families pledged by Hewlett-Packard and Hitachi.92 We also 
included the original control patents, which had been obtained by 
propensity score matching on priority year, IPC subclass, and 
publication authority. 
Updating the data turned out to be somewhat complex, partly 
because the original data were drawn from a PATSTAT version 
with non-permanent identifiers, and partly because PATSTAT 
itself changes over time, with some data disappearing due to 
changes in the data at the contributing national or regional patent 
offices. In addition, the list of patents on the EcoPC website 
appears to have changed slightly, to some extent in response to our 
comments on the original list (incorrect numbers, etc.). We used 
the April 2017 PATSTAT version and identified a correspondence 
between the prior identifying numbers and the permanent (as of 
April 2011) identifiers using information on the application 
number and authority of the relevant patents. In a few cases, we 
were unable to find the application number-authority combination 
                                                     
 92. In the case of the Hitachi patent, it is not clear that the patent was ever listed on 
EcoPC’s public website. All versions of the EcoPC list of patents that we were able to locate 
using web archive tools were current only as of May 2011, prior to Hitachi’s joining. 
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on the new version of PATSTAT. There were four such 
applications from the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), which 
apparently had been withdrawn and are no longer on its website.93 
We included them in our forward citation analysis as having zero 
cites, for completeness. In addition, twenty-four applications from 
the Australian Patent Office (APO) were reduced to twelve 
applications in the new PATSTAT file. Most of these problems 
affected the control patents rather than the Eco-patents. 
The resulting dataset contains 698 applications rather than 
the original 711, with the distribution shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Dataset Construction 
 
 Old (2011 data) New (2017 data) 
Number of applications 711 698 
     Controls 473 461 
     Eco-patents 238 237 
Number of equivalence groups 184 184 
     Controls 94 94 
     Eco-patents 90 90 
Number of citations 1872 4056 
     Controls 1205 2713 
     Eco-patents 667 1343 
Note: Controls matched based on the publication authorities, priority years, and IPC 
classes of the EcoPC patents. 
 
From Table 2, one can see that although the set of 
applications has changed slightly, we still have the same number 
of equivalent groups for the patents to be analyzed. It is also clear 
that the number of citations to both the EcoPC patents and 
controls has grown considerably, more than doubling in both 
cases.94 
For our inventor survey, we extracted from PATSTAT the 
names of all inventors of all 329 patents that cited an EcoPC 
patent after the patent had been pledged to the commons. We then 
focused only on those patents where the citation to the EcoPC 
patent was not added by the examiner. This left us with 141 
                                                     
 93. One problem with searching for JPO patents, especially the earlier ones, is that 
the numbering systems are quite complex and some numbers are apparently reused 
occasionally. See Tips of Performing Japanese Patent Numbers Search, PRIOR ART SEARCH 
& TRANSLATION, http://www.searchpriorart.com/search_tips/patent_no_search.htm [http 
s://perma.cc/WBC2-MWGY] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (explaining the complexities of 
Japanese patent numbering). This problem leads to apparent errors on the Espacenet and 
Google patents websites. We also found that at least two of the equivalent patents we had 
identified for the controls became utility model patents when they were granted in Japan. 
 94. See infra Section IV.C for further analysis of the citations.  
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patents (43%). After undertaking some name-cleaning and 
harmonization, we obtained a total of 271 inventors. We then 
searched the web for their contact information. We were able to 
send our short questionnaire, which consisted of only three 
questions, to seventy-one (26%) inventors. We obtained responses 
from thirteen inventors, a response rate of 18%. However, only ten 
of these thirteen inventors agreed to answer our questionnaire. 
These ten inventors worked for four different EcoPC member 
companies: three inventors worked for Bosch, three for IBM, three 
for DuPont and one for Xerox. These are the four firms that 
contributed the largest number of patents to the commons.95 We 
summarize the results briefly in Section IV.C, below. 
B. Legal Status of the Pledged Patents 
We began by looking at the legal status of the EcoPC pledged 
patents as of July 2017, summarized in Table 3. We collected these 
data from PATSTAT’s legal status tables of April 2017 and 
supplemented the information using web searches. The WO (PCT) 
patents in our database will not have a post-grant legal status 
since they are granted on a national basis, and a few patent 
applications from the JPO could not be found, probably because 
the PATSTAT entries were for translations or they were utility 
model applications in Japan, even though they might have been 
patent applications elsewhere. There are fifteen such patents for 
which we did not have legal status, or legal status is meaningless. 
Of the remaining 221 patent applications, almost 20% of the 
ninety priority patents were still in force as of July 2017, but only 
11% of all the equivalent patents. Of the twenty-seven patents still 
in force or pending, twelve are U.S. patents, six are Japanese, four 
are European Patent Office (EPO) or German, and the remainder 
are Chinese (one), Russian (two), Mexican (one), and Korean (one). 
Almost half the patents have expired for nonpayment of fees, 
although almost as many expired at the end of their terms. 
 
                                                     
 95. See supra Table 2. 
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Table 3: Legal Status of Eco-Patents – July 2017 
 All Priority All Priority 
pending 8 3 3.4% 3.3% 
granted and in force 19 14 8.1% 15.6% 
     Total still active 27 17 11.4% 18.9% 
nonpayment of fees 90 29 38.1% 32.2% 
expired at term 61 30 25.8% 33.3% 
rejected 18 7 7.6% 7.8% 
withdrawn 24 7 10.2% 7.8% 
     Total not active 193 73 81.8% 81.1% 
missing (from JPO)* 5 0 2.1% 0.0% 
WO applications 11 0 4.7% 0.0% 
     Total 236 90   
*These appear to be translation entries or utility models. 
 
In Figure 1 below, we show the distribution of patent lifetimes 
(approximated by the lapse (expiration or nonpayment) dates 
minus the application filing date).96 In the case of patents still in 
force, we measured the lifetime to July 2017. The distribution is 
fairly flat for those patents that did not remain in force for their 
full terms. A substantial number of patents remained in force for 
either the full 20-year patent term or a significant portion of it. 
This suggests that in many cases, companies decided to pay 
renewal fees to keep the patents in force even after they had been 
pledged to the EcoPC.97 For example JP4696713 “Wastewater 
treatment process”98 by Fuji Xerox is still in force in four out of five 
jurisdictions in which it was filed. Other patents still in force 
include Sony’s JP3876497 “Flocculating agent and a method for 
flocculation,”99 which was granted in early 2007, and IBM’s 
                                                     
 96. Most jurisdictions now have a common patent term: 20 years from the filing date, 
but there are various exceptions, and older patents in our sample may have been issued 
under different rules. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY INDICATORS 42 (2009), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/941 
/wipo_pub_941.pdf [https://perma.cc/SV96-JRJL]. When we were able to obtain the actual 
expiration date, we used that (most cases). 
 97. Renewal fees usually increase over time. At the USPTO for example, large 
entities pay $1,600 to maintain a patent in force 3.5 years after grant and $7,400 11.5 years 
after grant. See USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov 
/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule.html 
[https://perma.cc/PZ8E-RG8B] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).  
 98. See JP Patent No. 4,696,713 (issued June 8, 2011); see also Waste Water 
Treatment Method, GOOGLE PAT., https://patents.google.com/patent/JP4696713B2/en [htt 
ps://perma.cc/U6KA-BNNL] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
 99. See JP Patent No. 3,876,497 (issued Jan. 31, 2007); see also Flocculants and 
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US6294028 “Mercury process gold ballbond removal 
apparatus,”100 which was granted in 2001 and maintained in force 
throughout the entire lifetime of the EcoPC. However, there are 
also patents such as US5050676 “Apparatus for two phase vacuum 
extraction of soil contaminants”101 owned by Xerox; the patent has 
five equivalents, four of which had expired before the patent was 
pledged, and the remaining patent expired at term less than a year 
and a half after the patent was pledged and no maintenance fees 
were payable during that time. This is an example of the pledge of 
a patent that most likely no longer had any value to the company. 
 
Figure 1: Patent Lifetime Distribution for Eco-Patents 
 
Figure 2 below breaks down the different reasons why patents 
lapsed. It shows that a significant number of patents have expired 
since 2007, the year before the EcoPC was launched. A few patents 
were rejected by the relevant patent offices or were withdrawn by 
applicants, but the majority lapsed due to nonpayment of renewal 
fees. 
                                                     
Coagulation Method Using the Same, GOOGLE PAT., https://patents.google.com/patent/JP38 
76497B2/en?oq=JP3876497 [https://perma.cc/YGT5-5W3T] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
 100. See U.S. Patent No. 6,294,028 (issued Sept. 25, 2001). 
 101. See U.S. Patent No. 5,050,676 (issued Sept. 24, 1991). 
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Figure 2: Lapse Trends for Eco-Patents 
 
Table 4 below shows the geographic coverage of the EcoPC 
patents. Ninety percent of the priority patent applications were 
made to the four most important jurisdictions: the U.S., Germany, 
Japan, and the EPO, and these jurisdictions account for 80% of the 
patents overall. There is very little evidence that the patents in 
the commons ever covered less-developed countries. The only 
patents in middle-income countries are in Brazil (seven), Mexico 
(four), and Argentina (one), and there are none in low-income 
countries. The lack of patents in low-income areas shows that 
patents could not have been an obstacle to the use of technologies 
in less-developed countries. 
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Table 4: Application Authority Distribution 
Authority  Priorities All 
USA US 34 75 
Germany DE 20 45 
Japan JP 17 34 
EPO EP 10 34 
South Korea KR 2 7 
China CN 2 3 
Austria AT 1 4 
Spain ES 1 4 
UK GB 1 2 
Norway NO 1 2 
Denmark DK 1 1 
Brazil BR  7 
Canada CA  7 
Mexico MX  4 
Australia AU  2 
Russia RU  2 
Argentina AR  1 
France FR  1 
Hong Kong HK  1 
Israel IL  1 
Total  90 237 
C. Technology Diffusion and Follow-On Innovation 
Next, we reexamine the question of technology diffusion by 
looking at the updated citation data. Hall and Helmers have 
previously suggested that pledged patents protect 
environmentally friendly technologies that could have the 
potential to be adopted for use by third parties.102 To analyze any 
effect on diffusion, we adopt a difference-in-differences estimation, 
comparing the number of forward citations received by patents 
pledged to the EcoPC before and after they were pledged to 
citations received by the set of matched control patents that were 
not pledged to the EcoPC. Our estimation approach allows for 
different citation patterns between the set of EcoPC and control 
patents before the EcoPC patents were pledged. This accounts for 
concerns that pre-pledge citation behavior could be correlated with 
the decision to pledge a given patent to the EcoPC. 
Table 5 below shows a comparison of standard patent 
characteristics between the set of patents pledged to the EcoPC 
and the matched (by priority year, IPC subclass, and publication 
                                                     
 102. Hall & Helmers, supra note 41, at 34–35. 
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authority) control patents where we focus on the priority patents 
(Table A-1 in the Appendix shows the data for all equivalents). 
There are no statistically significant differences between the grant 
lag, the number of backward or non-patent literature references 
between the two sets of patents. Interestingly, EcoPC patents are 
more frequently granted. However, control patents have a larger 
family size and a larger number of claims, both of which are 
commonly used patent value indicators. This suggests that the 
EcoPC patents are potentially of less value than otherwise 
comparable patents. When we look at the number of forward 
citations received, the set of control patents accumulated a larger 
average number of citations than the pledged patents. 
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Table 5: Mean Patent Characteristics for eighty-nine Eco-
Patents and ninety Control Patents 
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Table 6 below shows the share of EcoPC and control patents 
that receive any citations as well as the average number of 
citations received.103 As indicated earlier, compared to Table 6 in 
Hall and Helmers prior work,104 there are slightly fewer 
equivalents of our EcoPC patents and controls due to missing data 
and the consolidation at the APO. The share of patents that have 
citations has increased, becoming close to 90% for the equivalence 
groups, and the average citations per equivalence group has more 
than doubled. None of these results are unexpected, given the 
additional five years of data, as well as probable improvements in 
the PATSTAT coverage itself, but these results also highlight our 
much improved ability to assess the question of technology 
diffusion as a result of the EcoPC. 
 




group all patents 
equivalence 
group all patents 
 
Total patents Share with citations 
Total cita-
tions 
Eco-patents 237 90 73.0% 85.6% 1343 
Controls 461 94 57.1% 93.6% 2713 
      
 Average citations* Average citations**  
Eco-patents 10.5 17.4 5.7 14.9  
Controls 13.2 30.8 5.9 28.9  
Note: Citations are measured as all forward citations in the patent literature between 
the application date and April/May 2017, adjusted for citations by equivalent patents 
in other jurisdictions. 
* Average over patents with nonzero citations. 
** Average over all patents. 
 
Table 7 and Figure 3 below show the key results of our new 
analysis. Poisson and negative binomial models of citations at the 
patent-level show that EcoPC patents are half as likely to be cited 
than the controls (an elasticity of 0.4–0.6), and even less likely 
after donation, although this last result is only marginally 
significant. These regressions control for both priority year and the 
citation lag using dummies. 
It is well-known that the citation lag distribution for patents 
has a somewhat smooth structure, rising at first to a peak at three 
to five years and then declining slowly.105 We therefore attempt to 
                                                     
 103. See infra Table A-2 (showing a comparison of patent characteristics for patents 
with nonzero forward citations). 
 104. Hall & Helmers, supra note 41, at 45–46.  
 105. Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights 
and Methodological Tools 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 
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improve the precision of our estimates by imposing the Jaffe-
Trajtenberg model of citation diffusion and decline106 rather than 
using the citation lag dummies. This model, shown in the final 
three columns of Table 7 below, uses a parametric model for the 
citation lag that is given by the following equation: 
 
0 1 1 2 2
(1 ) ( ) exp[ (1 ) ][1 exp( (1 ) s)]
st eco eco after after e eco e eco st
c D D f t D s Db d d b b b b e= + + - + - + +  
 
Where “t” is the priority year of the cited patent, “s” is the 
citation lag, and “cst” is the citation rate (the number of citations 
at that lag per sample patents available to be cited). f(t) is modeled 
as a set of priority year dummies. That is, the unit of observation 
is the average cites per patents with a given priority year, citation 
lag, and patent type (EcoPC patent before and after or control). 
Prior experience with this specification suggests that although it 
is an appealing model in that it captures both the initial increase 
in citation due to knowledge diffusion and the decline due to 
knowledge age, it is quite difficult to estimate successfully.107 We 
do it in two ways: (1) nonlinear least squares with a dependent 
variable equal to average cites per patent; and (2) Poisson with a 
dependent variable equal to the total cites at the given lag to 
patents with a given priority year. In the latter case, we multiply 
the right-hand side of the model by the number of patents, so the 
models are equivalent. The results of the two estimation strategies 
are similar. Once we impose a model on the citation lag, the EcoPC 
patents are cited an average of 25% less than the controls, and 
there is no change after donation. The decay (obsolescence) and 
diffusion parameters are similar to those obtained by Hall and 
collaborators108 for the U.S. patent data, with obsolescence 
increasing by about 5% per year, and diffusion about 50%. 
However, keep in mind that one reason the first is relatively low 
and the second relatively high is that there is a secular growth in 
citations that is not completely captured by the priority year 
dummies. That is, this model imposes a fixed citation lag structure 
on the data which is then allowed to be higher or lower, depending 
on priority year and EcoPC status. Because citations are often 
added by examiners rather than applicants,109 we also report 
                                                     
2001); Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, International Knowledge Flows: Evidence from 
Patent Citations 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6507, 1998).  
 106. Jaffe & Trajtenberg, supra note 105, at 19. 
 107. Hall et al., supra note 105, 29–33.  
 108. Id. at 33. 
 109. Note that for the purposes of analyzing diffusion, it is preferable to include 
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results in Appendix Table A-3 and Figure B-1 where we retain only 
citations made by applicants. That said, the results are very 
similar to the ones reported in Table 7 and Figure 3; there is no 
evidence of increased diffusion of patents after they were pledged 
to the EcoPC. 
 
                                                     
citations added by examiners because these citations also indicate that the citing patent 
builds on the cited prior art where this relationship was identified by examiners who are 
commonly experts in the relevant technology areas. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466156 
57 HOUS. L. REV. 61 (2019) 
2019] ECO-PATENT COMMONS 97 
Table 7: Estimation of Citation Lag Models 
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Figure 3: Cites per Patent by Citing Year (as of May 2017) 
 
Table 7 and Figure 3 show that there is little change in 
aggregate citation differences between EcoPC patents and controls 
before and after being pledged to the commons, although EcoPC 
patents are cited less overall. It is important to remember, 
however, that because the pledging firms retain a defensive 
termination right, there may be continuing innovation building on 
these patents that does not result in new patent applications (and 
citations). That is, there are limits created on the enforcement of 
patent rights by the firms that use the technologies in these 
patents, which may reduce the benefits of subsequent patenting, 
and thus reduce citations to the pledged patent. This issue is 
related to a broader problem: our analysis of diffusion only looks 
for diffusion that leads to follow-on innovation that is patented. 
This excludes simple use of pledged patented technologies and 
even follow-on innovation if it does not lead to a patent filing. 
However, in the absence of any information on the use of pledged 
patents,110 the forward citation analysis is the only way to 
quantitatively assess the impact of the patent pledge on diffusion. 
It is also possible that the nature of the citation changes, in 
that the technology in the patents becomes more useful to 
individuals and nonprofit institutions given the absence of royalty 
requirements. We investigate this question by looking at the 
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source of the citations to the EcoPC patents and controls before 
and after donation. We divide the cites into five groupings 
according to their source: (1) self-citations from the firm that owns 
the pledged patent; (2) citations from other EcoPC participants; (3) 
citations from other firms; (4) citations from individual patentees; 
and (5) citations from non-profit institutions (universities, 
hospitals, public research organizations (PROs), and 
governments). We then define the before and after period for each 
grouping of citations according to the relation between the earliest 
priority date for the citing patent and the date the cited patent was 
donated to the commons. The results are shown in Table 8 below. 
In some cases, sample sizes are fairly small, but it does appear 
that self-citation falls relative to all the other categories, with the 
largest increases (by percentage) in citations by other EcoPC 
participants and non-profit institutions. 
One issue that arises when counting the source of citations is 
that many patents have multiple applicants of different types. 
Given the nonrivalry of knowledge, which implies that one citer’s 
use of the knowledge in a patent does not depend on use by another 
citer, it might be appropriate to simply count all the applicant-
citations as citations as we did in the first panel of Table 8. 
Nevertheless, we also show a weighted version of the table in the 
second panel where the weights are proportional to the inverse of 
the number of applicants on the citing patent.111 Although the 
distribution of cites changes dramatically when we weight, due to 
the tendency of individuals to share in applications, the 
qualitative conclusions with respect to the post-commons citing 
behavior are the same. 
 
                                                     
 111. We removed individual inventor-applicants where there was also a firm applicant 
before computing the weights, on the grounds that these applicants usually are employed 
by the firm in question. 
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Table 8: Citations to the Eco-Patents by Citer Type 
 
D. Inventor Awareness 
As described in Section IV.A, in order to validate our 
quantitative results, we asked the inventors of patents that cited 
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an EcoPC patent after it was pledged: (a) whether they were aware 
of the citation (we exclude citations added by examiners); (b) if 
they were aware of the citation, whether they knew that the cited 
patent was part of the EcoPC; and (c) if they answered (a) and (b) 
affirmatively, whether the fact that the EcoPC patent was 
available for use royalty-free played any role in their decision to 
rely on it as prior art. As Section IV.A explains, we obtained valid 
responses from ten inventors; 50% indicated that they were aware 
of the citation, but none of them were aware that the cited patent 
was part of the EcoPC. While the sample of inventors is obviously 
very small, it nevertheless confirms our quantitative results: the 
pledge of a patent to the EcoPC was ineffective in spurring the 
diffusion of the patented invention. In fact, the responses from the 
inventors also confirm the results of our interviews with company 
representatives as they suggest that inventors were unaware of 
the EcoPC even when they relied on patents that were part of the 
EcoPC as prior art. 
V. ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS 
The results of our analysis suggest fairly strongly that the 
technologies covered by the contributed patents did not in fact 
attract significant interest by third parties, even before 
contribution to the commons. As a result, pledging these patents 
to the commons did not affect the interest of third parties in their 
underlying technologies and hence the commons did not promote 
their use and diffusion. 
There is a growing literature concerning the factors that 
motivate patent holders to join patent pooling arrangements and 
seeking to understand why some patent holders elect not to join 
such pools.112 The potential for monetary gain, which is central to 
many pooling decisions, is not a factor with respect to 
philanthropic and CSR-oriented pools such as EcoPC. Also, unlike 
the MPP and the NTD Pool, the EcoPC lacked significant 
governmental support and incentives,113 perhaps making its path 
more challenging from the outset. 
One of the reasons for the EcoPC’s lack of effectiveness is 
likely the fact that it was conceived and implemented by the 
suppliers of technology as a volunteer effort without consulting the 
                                                     
 112. See Layne-Farrar & Lerner, supra note 21, at 294–95; Michael Mattioli, Patent 
Pool Outsiders, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 225, 240 (2018).  
 113. See Mattioli, supra note 29, at 125–27 (describing governmental support and 
incentives in connection with MPP and NTD Pool). 
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demand side (potential users of these patents/technologies).114 As 
such, the EcoPC was constructed in such a way that it was not 
easy for potential users to understand how the available 
technologies could be used. It simply offered a passive website with 
patent listings, rather than suggestions on how these technologies 
could be utilized, either separately or together.115 Our results 
suggest that effective technology diffusion requires more than 
patent non-assertion, especially in the developing world. As 
discussed above, technical assistance and technology/know-how 
transfer are essential for implementing environmental 
technologies to an even greater degree than for software or 
pharma, and patent disclosures alone are seldom sufficient to 
enable someone to implement a technology effectively.116 
Likewise, there was little or no coordination among EcoPC 
contributors regarding the technologies covered by the patents 
they were pledging. As previously discussed by Hall and 
Helmers,117 the pledged patents appeared largely to protect 
different technologies. Hence, the implementation of a given 
technology might not have been possible using only pledged 
patents (i.e., any of the covered technologies could require the use 
of additional patents not contributed to the commons). As a result, 
synergies that could have emerged from the contribution of 
multiple patents covering selected technologies did not emerge. 
Related to the previous point, the EcoPC was organized as a 
volunteer effort. Members paid no fees, and the WBCSD and ELI 
managed the organization largely as an accommodation to IBM. 
Without payment, ancillary value-added services are unlikely to 
be provided. This being said, some interviewees stated that their 
companies would not have joined EcoPC had they been required to 
pay membership fees. So, there is a clear trade-off, or perhaps a 
                                                     
 114. A different approach has been attempted by WIPO Green, an online technology 
exchange platform that allows both potential technology users and suppliers to specify their 
needs and to find suitable transaction partners. See WIPO GREEN – The Marketplace for 
Sustainable Technology, WIPO, https://www3.wipo.int/wipogreen/en/ [https://perma.cc/5E 
8E-X22P] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). Though WIPO Green has been operational since 
2013, it is not clear that any substantial number of transactions are being effected using 
the platform, and several improvements have been suggested by commentators. See Joy Y. 
Xiang, IPR Management in International Cleantech Cooperation, 32 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 
48–50 (forthcoming 2019).  
 115. A similarly unsuccessful supply-side model for patents can be found in the IPXI 
Exchange, an attempt to offer unitized licenses of pooled patents essential to certain 
industry standards. Like the EcoPC, IPXI failed to achieve significant take-up and 
eventually discontinued its operations. See Jorge L. Contreras, FRAND Market Failure: 
IPXI’s Standards-Essential Patent License Exchange, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 419, 
432–39 (2016).  
 116. See supra notes 82–83.  
 117. Hall & Helmers, supra note 41, at 34–36. 
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need for public support or a tax incentive if an activity such as 
EcoPC is viewed as socially desirable. This also means that the 
ability to distribute the fixed costs associated with managing such 
an institution favors an approach that brings together a larger 
number of participating companies than the EcoPC. 
Low membership can be attributed, in part, to the cost of the 
internal patent analysis that was required to contribute. Several 
of the original EcoPC participants were large, sophisticated 
organizations with internal patent analytical resources and a clear 
understanding of which patents would, and would not, advance 
corporate goals. Other firms may not have wanted to risk giving 
away a patent that could have potential value. Likewise, the 
internal effort of identifying these patents, without a clear payoff, 
may not have been viewed as worth the effort by overworked 
patent counsel. 
Perhaps the most cogent critique of the EcoPC was its failure 
to track patent utilization. Without knowledge of how/whether 
patents were being utilized, companies could not justify expending 
further effort on the activity. Moreover, even the PR benefit of 
belonging to the EcoPC waned after the initial contributions, given 
that there were no ‘success stories’ to promote. More generally, the 
lack of information on usage meant that it was very difficult to 
gauge the success of the initiative and to make adjustments to its 
structure and management to improve its performance. Finally, 
the lack of demonstrable results from the project eroded the 
potential PR benefits that member firms may have hoped to 
achieve from participation in the EcoPC. 
The lack of usage tracking underscores another weakness of 
the EcoPC, especially when compared to more successful pledge 
communities: the lack of dedicated administrative and managerial 
resources devoted to expanding and promoting the commons. 
While EcoPC was housed within well-established organizations 
such as WBCSD and ELI, these organizations received no 
additional compensation for managing the EcoPC and appear to 
have taken on this role as an accommodation to a significant 
member (IBM). Most trade associations have dedicated personnel 
for membership development, and enrolling members takes 
significant time and effort. Without these resources, it is not 
surprising that the EcoPC was unable to recruit a larger body of 
members nor that WBCSD and ELI spent few additional funds for 
EcoPC recruitment. As the example of DPL has shown,118 the lack 
of dedicated managerial and promotional resources can contribute 
                                                     
 118. Contreras, Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape, supra note 5, at 567–68.  
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to the failure of a pledge community to gain significant traction in 
the marketplace. 
These difficulties and potential missteps in implementing the 
EcoPC almost certainly contributed to its demise, but they may 
not have been the only reasons that the EcoPC failed. Mattioli, 
writing near the peak of the EcoPC’s activity, observed the diffuse 
and overly broad nature of the EcoPC’s scope: reducing 
environmental harm.119 This broad remit, in contrast to the goals 
of the narrowly focused MPP and NTD Pool, could have made it 
more difficult for potential licensees to conceptualize solutions to 
particular environmental problems using the tools offered by the 
EcoPC. 
More generally, however, the EcoPC may have been a victim 
of changing corporate priorities in the global business 
environment. When IBM introduced the idea of the EcoPC to other 
large corporations in 2006, corporate sustainability had recently 
gone mainstream.120 Many large corporations were experimenting 
with sustainability strategies and campaigns. The global economic 
recession that followed, however, served to constrain the social 
programs promoted by firms, including sustainability programs.121 
One of the ways in which ESR programs may have been “trimmed” 
during hard economic times was by emphasizing those 
programmatic components that would appeal specifically to 
consumers and de-emphasizing others.122 The EcoPC, which was, 
almost by definition, tangential to the principal product markets 
in which its participants operated, may have had little direct 
impact on participants’ customer relations. As such, attention to 
initiatives such as the EcoPC may have waned over the years of 
the global economic downturn, until the project finally withered 
entirely in 2016. This possibility is corroborated by the fact that at 
least half of the corporate EcoPC representatives whom we 
interviewed were retired at the time of our interview. The EcoPC 
and the ideals that it embodied may have been the product of a 
prior generation of corporate managers. If this is the case, then 
new commons efforts in the environmental space will need to 
develop strategies to rekindle corporate interest in ESR and green-
technology solutions. 
                                                     
 119. Mattioli, supra note 29, at 155.  
 120. See Just Good Business: A Special Report on Corporate Social Responsibility, 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 19, 2008), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2008/01/19/just-goo 
d-business [https://perma.cc/Y9KH-NXFH] (interviewing Daniel Franklin). 
 121. See Michael L. Barnett et al., Sustainability Strategy in Constrained Economic 
Times, 48 LONG RANGE PLANNING 63, 64 (2015). 
 122. Id. at 66.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The EcoPC represented a novel and ambitious cooperative 
activity by leading international firms to improve environmental 
sustainability through the contribution of under-utilized, non-core 
patents to a publicly-accessible pool. Though the participants in 
the EcoPC represented some of the largest and most influential 
patent holders in the world, our results demonstrate that the effort 
achieved only modest results and contributed little to technology 
diffusion. There are numerous reasons hypothesized for the failure 
of the EcoPC, ranging from defects in implementation, reporting 
and management, to a general shift away from corporate 
environmental and sustainability programs lacking direct 
customer benefits. Future initiatives seeking to make green 
technologies more widely available should consider the lessons 
learned from the EcoPC. There are clear trade-offs between costs 
and benefits that organizers of future efforts should consider. 
The experience of the EcoPC, even though it did not realize its 
ambitious goals, has helped to advance our understanding of how 
patent commons can work and fail to work. As such, the EcoPC 
has made an undeniable contribution to the study of patent 
commons and pledges. The failure of the EcoPC to achieve 
significant technology diffusion and to attract significant 
corporate participation should not be viewed as a failure of the 
patent commons model itself. Instead, this worthwhile effort 
should be viewed as an invitation to experiment further with, and 
to improve upon, the patent commons model both in the area of 
green technologies and beyond. 
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Table A-1: Mean Patent Characteristics for 236 Eco-Patents 
and 454 Control Patents 
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Table A-2: Patents with Nonzero Forward Cites Only  
(437 Controls; 218 Eco-Patents) 
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Table A-3: Applicant Cites Only 
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL FIGURE 
Figure B-1: Applicant Cites per Patent by Citing Year (as of 
May 2017) 
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